BY LINCOLN AMANKE
THE arrest of a person suspected of committing a crime is ordinarily the beginning of a criminal investigation, not the end of one.
Yet, in contemporary Nigeria, it is increasingly common to see persons arrested by law-enforcement agencies presented to the public through photographs, press releases, videos, press briefings and, on some occasions, placards identifying their names and the offences they are alleged to have committed.
The practice has attracted considerable criticism from lawyers, civil society organisations and members of the public who contend that it amounts to trying a person in the court of public opinion before the person is tried by a court of law.
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) operate in an environment in which public confidence in law enforcement is itself an important consideration.
Their responsibilities involve investigating sophisticated financial crimes, drug trafficking, cybercrime-related offences and other serious criminal conduct.
Consequently, communicating the results of their operations to the public is not inherently objectionable.
Indeed, the NDLEA maintains a Directorate of Media and Advocacy whose responsibilities include coordinating media coverage of Agency activities, issuing press releases concerning its operations and facilitating public enlightenment through various media platforms.
The real question, therefore, should not be whether law-enforcement agencies are entitled to speak about their work. They plainly have legitimate reasons to do so.
Rather, the question is how far they may go in publicizing an allegation against a person who has not yet been convicted, and at what point legitimate public communication becomes prejudicial treatment of a suspect.
This distinction is important because the criminal justice system must protect two interests simultaneously: The interest of society in effective crime control and the interest of an individual in being treated according to law.
A responsible criminal justice system should not require the State to remain silent about its successes, but neither should the pursuit of public confidence permit an agency to assume the role of prosecutor, judge and public executioner
Rationale Behind Publicity By Law-Enforcement Agencie
THERE is a reasonable argument in favour of the public communication of arrests and enforcement operations. Law-enforcement agencies operate with public resources and are accountable to the public.
Where an agency makes a significant seizure, arrests persons allegedly involved in organised crime, recovers proceeds of crime or disrupts a criminal network, informing the public may serve legitimate governmental and societal purposes.
Publicity may also assist investigations. Publishing information about a suspect, particularly where the person is wanted or where members of the public may possess information relevant to an investigation, can assist law enforcement in identifying other persons involved or obtaining information from potential witnesses and victims.
There is also a deterrent argument. Public knowledge that law-enforcement agencies are actively pursuing cybercrime, drug trafficking, money laundering and other offences may discourage persons from engaging in such activities.
In an environment where sophisticated criminal enterprises frequently exploit social media and public communication themselves, it would be unrealistic to expect law-enforcement agencies to operate entirely outside the public information space.
Moreover, public communication can demonstrate institutional effectiveness. An agency that continually arrests suspects, recovers illicit substances or assets and disrupts criminal networks may reasonably wish to demonstrate that it is fulfilling the mandate assigned to it by law.
The difficulty begins when these legitimate objectives are pursued through methods that communicate guilt, rather than suspicion.
The distinction may appear subtle, but legally it is fundamental:
The Legal Position
SECTION 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides that every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty.
This principle is fundamental to criminal justice because the State bears the burden of establishing criminal responsibility; the accused does not have to prove his innocence.
There is, however, an important technical point. Section 36(5) speaks expressly of a person who has been “charged” with a criminal offence. Many persons publicly presented by law-enforcement agencies have not yet been arraigned before a court.
It would therefore be overly simplistic to argue that section 36(5), by itself, prohibits every form of publicity concerning every arrested person.
The stronger constitutional argument is that the absence of a formal charge does not place an arrested person outside the protection of the Constitution. Section 34 protects the dignity of the human person; section 35 protects personal liberty; and section 37 protects the privacy of citizens. These rights remain relevant during investigation.
The Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 reinforces this position. Section 8 requires a suspect to be accorded humane treatment having regard to his right to dignity and prohibits torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
The Act therefore does not contemplate arrest as a point at which the ordinary dignity of an individual is suspended. Nigerian human-rights institutions have similarly emphasised the continuing importance of dignity and the presumption of innocence during investigation.
Consequently, the proper legal question is not simply whether an agency is permitted to announce an arrest. It is whether the manner, language, imagery and circumstances of that announcement are consistent with the legal status of the person being investigated.
Nigerian Courts Have Expressed Serious Concern
THE Nigerian courts have not treated pre-trial public parading as an insignificant administrative practice.
In Ndukwem Chiziri Nice v Attorney General of the Federation & Anor (2007) CHR 218, the court condemned the presentation of the applicant before the press shortly after his arrest.
Justice Adebukola Banjoko described the act as “uncalled for” and a callous disregard for the suspect’s person, holding that the police had effectively prejudged the suspect and thereby encroached upon matters constitutionally reserved for the court.
The decision is important because the court’s objection was not simply to the existence of publicity. The deeper concern was that the police had assumed the function of determining guilt.
A similarly compelling example is Ottoh Obono v Commissioner of Police, Lagos State & Ors. Obono was publicly paraded and presented to journalists as a member of an armed robbery gang.
His photograph was subsequently published and the report broadcast. He was eventually exonerated by the Director of Public Prosecutions.
The Federal High Court condemned the treatment and awarded exemplary damages of N20million. The court observed that the conduct made nonsense of the applicant’s constitutional presumption of innocence.
The significance of Obono goes beyond the monetary award; it demonstrates the practical danger of premature publicity: a person can be publicly convicted in the eyes of society and subsequently be legally exonerated by the State.
The damage in such circumstances cannot always be undone by a later acquittal or discontinuance. A photograph published online may remain accessible for years; an allegation may be reproduced by other media platforms; employers, friends and members of the public may remember the accusation without ever learning of the eventual exoneration.
The ECOWAS Court of Justice similarly considered the issue in Dyot Bayi & 14 Ors v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2004–2009) CCJLER 245. The Court held that presenting persons before the press when no judge or court had found them guilty violated the principle of presumption of innocence under Article 7(b) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
These authorities make one proposition difficult to ignore: An investigative agency may investigate guilt, but it cannot conclusively pronounce guilt merely because it has arrested a person.
Placard Proble,
THE use of placards deserves particular attention because it changes the character of publicity.
There is a material difference between photographing a suspect during an arrest operation and photographing the suspect while he is holding a placard identifying him by name and alleged offence. The latter creates an image of official condemnation.
This is particularly problematic where the image is subsequently distributed through television, newspapers, Facebook, Instagram, X, TikTok and other platforms.
The agency’s institutional authority gives the publication considerable credibility. Members of the public are likely to assume that the State would not publicly identify a person as a drug trafficker or fraudster unless the State had already established that fact.
That is where the practice risks becoming a media trial.
It also raises a broader question concerning institutional responsibility. If an agency knows that its public statements are likely to influence public perception, it should be particularly careful to distinguish an allegation from an established fact.
Should Law-Enforcement Agencies Be Prohibited From Publicising Suspects Entirely
IN my view, an absolute prohibition would be neither practical nor necessarily desirable. The State has legitimate interests in informing the public about crime and enforcement activities. There may be circumstances in which publishing the identity or photograph of a suspect is necessary to advance an investigation.
A person who is wanted, suspected of being part of an organised criminal network, or believed to possess information necessary to protect potential victims may legitimately become the subject of public notification.
Even the NDLEA’s present position illustrates this distinction. In 2022, its Director of Media and Advocacy stated publicly that the Agency did not physically parade suspects before journalists, while acknowledging that it publishes photographs and videos of some suspects and recoveries to demonstrate its work.
This suggests that the better approach is not to eliminate law-enforcement publicity but to regulate it.
The issue should therefore be approached through the following principles: Publicity should serve an identifiable law-enforcement purpose.
The language used should distinguish allegations from established facts. A suspect should not be described as a “criminal,” “fraudster,” “drug trafficker” or similar term unless that description reflects a lawful conviction.
Photographs should not be used merely to humiliate or celebrate the capture of a suspect even though that may not be the obvious reason of the agency in question.
Personal information should be disclosed only where reasonably necessary for the legitimate purpose of the communication.
The agency should avoid unnecessary disclosure of addresses, telephone numbers, family information and other private information.
Where a suspect is subsequently exonerated, discharged or acquitted, reasonable corrective publicity should be considered.
Publicity And Right To Privacy
THE publication of biodata introduces another dimension to the debate. The fact that an agency lawfully obtains information about a suspect for investigative purposes does not necessarily mean that every item of that information may be published to the world.
There is an important distinction between collection for investigation and publication for public consumption.
An agency may legitimately require a suspect’s name, address, photograph, telephone number or other identifying information for investigation. But the necessity of possessing information does not automatically establish the necessity of publicly disseminating it.
This is particularly relevant in the contemporary digital environment. Once personal information is published online, the agency may lose control over its subsequent use.
A person’s photograph can be copied, reposted, altered, archived and permanently associated with an allegation even if the allegation is later found to be untrue.
The public interest in transparency must therefore be balanced against the individual’s legitimate expectation of dignity and privacy.
The Effect On Administration Of Criminal Justice
THE consequences of public parading extend beyond the individual suspect. First, it may weaken public confidence in the courts. If an agency publicly announces that a person is a fraudster or drug trafficker and the court subsequently acquits the person, members of the public may perceive the court’s decision as a technical escape rather than the proper outcome of a criminal trial.
Second, premature publicity may affect potential witnesses and evidence. Public exposure of an investigation may alert other suspects, enable destruction of evidence or influence witnesses before they testify.
Third, it may undermine the credibility of the prosecution. A criminal case should ordinarily be built upon admissible evidence, not public relations. Where an agency appears more interested in demonstrating that it has made an arrest than in demonstrating that it can prove the charge, the emphasis of criminal justice risks shifting from investigation and prosecution to publicity and performance.
Fourth, the practice may disproportionately affect persons who are eventually found innocent. The State can release a person after investigation, but it cannot easily restore a reputation that has already been damaged by its own publicity.
Better Approach: Lawful Public Communication
THE answer, therefore, should be neither unrestricted publicity nor complete silence. The EFCC and NDLEA should adopt clear internal media protocols regulating the publication of information concerning persons who have not been convicted.
Such protocols should establish a distinction between public information necessary for law enforcement and publicity designed primarily to portray the agency as successful.
The former may be legitimate. The latter becomes problematic when it sacrifices the rights of suspects for institutional image-building.
The agencies should also consider adopting terminology such as “suspected of,” “alleged to have,” “arrested in connection with” or “under investigation for”, rather than categorical statements of guilt.
Where the publication of a photograph is necessary, the agency should be able to identify the investigative purpose served by publishing it. Where no such purpose exists, publication should be reconsidered.
A further safeguard should be introduced for persons who are eventually exonerated. Where an agency has publicly associated an individual with a serious offence and the individual is subsequently discharged, acquitted or otherwise cleared, the agency should, where appropriate, issue a corrective statement with comparable prominence.
Conclusion
THE fight against crime requires effective law-enforcement agencies. Nigeria cannot reasonably expect the EFCC, NDLEA and other security agencies to combat sophisticated criminal organisations while remaining invisible to the public.
Transparency, public education, deterrence and accountability are legitimate objectives of law enforcement.
The problem, therefore, is not publicity itself; the problem arises where publicity ceases to communicate an investigation and begins to communicate a conviction.
A suspect is not a convict. An arrest is not a conviction. An allegation is not proof. An investigation is not an adjudication. The constitutional order requires these distinctions to remain meaningful.
The strongest case for reform is consequently not that EFCC and NDLEA should be prohibited from informing Nigerians about their work. Rather, it is that their communications should be accurate, necessary, proportionate and consistent with the legal status of the person concerned.
The objective should be to allow the agencies to tell Nigerians: “We have arrested a person whom we suspect of committing this offence,” without allowing the State to tell Nigerians, “this person is guilty.”
The first is law enforcement. The second belongs to the court.
Ultimately, the credibility of an institution responsible for enforcing the law is not measured merely by how many suspects it arrests or how impressive its press conferences appear.
It is also measured by whether, in pursuing those suspected of violating the law, the institution itself remains within the law.
That should be the standard by which the public parade and media publication of suspects by the EFCC, NDLEA and other law-enforcement agencies in Nigeria ought to be judged.
