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A Casual Remark On TV Cannot Be Elevated To Judicial Confession, El-Rufai Tells Court

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*Court Fixes April 23 For Arraignment

DETAINED former governor of Kaduna State, Nasir El-Rufai, has filed before the Federal High Court in Abuja, 17 reasons why he cannot be prosecuted for allegedly intercepting phone communications of the National Security Adviser (NSA), Nuhu Ribadu.
In the motion on notice filed through his team of lawyers, led by Oluwole Iyamu, the former Federal Capital Territory (FCT) minister, who is scheduled for arraignment on Wednesday, asked the court to quash the three-count charge the Department of State Services (DSS) preferred against him, arguing that the charge, marked FHC/ABJ/CR/99/2026, was not only incompetent and legally defective, but constituted a misuse of the judicial process for a political witch-hunt.
According to him, the DSS has no legal backing to elevate a “casual remark” he made during a television interview to “a confession” that he had indeed tapped the NSA’s telephone line as alleged, noting that his statement did not constitute a confessional statement in law, insisting that for a statement to be admissible as a confession, “it must be made under caution, voluntarily and in circumstances that satisfy the Judges’ Rules.”
El-Rufai maintained that statements he made in the course of his television interview were “without any caution or warning, in a voluntary public discussion and without the protections afforded to suspects in custody, adding: “A casual remark in a television programme cannot be elevated to a judicial confession.”
In any case, he queried the competence of the charge on the ground that it contained a “non-legal terminology,” drawing the attention of the court to the use of the word “cohorts” in Count-1 of the charge, saying it demonstrated “a fundamental lack of understanding of criminal pleading.”
El-Rufai insisted that the word is a “colloquial, non-legal term” that appeared nowhere in the Criminal Code, Penal Code, the ACJA or any statute in the country, adding: “It is ambiguous, imprecise and has no defined legal meaning.”
He further argued that the DSS failed to provide the “essential ingredients of the offence of interception under the Nigerian Communications Act 2003,” saying for the security agency to properly charge him for the offence of interception of the NSA’s calls, it must disclose the communication that was intercepted and the equipment used.
He consequently prayed the court to strike out the charge for failing to dosclose any offence known to the law and for failing to establish a prima face case to warrant his prosecution.
In addition to applying to be discharged from the case, El-Rufai demanded a N2billion cost to be awarded against the DSS “for the abuse and misuse of the court process, and the egregious, reckless and unconstitutional misuse of the criminal justice system to harass, embarrass and publicly victimise the defendant/applicant.”
The motion was brought pursuant to Section 6(6) (A) and 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended; Section 221 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015 and Order 48 Rule 1 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019.
El-Rufai is billed to appear before trial Justice Joyce Abdulmalik to enter his plea to the charge against him endorsed by a team of five prosecutors from the DSS, led by M. E. Ernest, alleging that he committed the crime with some people currently on the run.
It charge alleged that the former governor admitted on February 13, when he appeared as a guest on a television programme in Abuja, that he aligned with others and unlawfully intercepted the phone communications of the NSA, thereby committing an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 12(1) of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) (Amendment) Act, 2024.
It further alleged that he had in the course of the television interview, stated that he knew and related to a certain individual who had unlawfully intercepted the NSA’s telephone communications without reporting the person to the relevant security agencies, and by so doing, committed an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 27 (b) of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition , Prevention, etc) Amendment, Act, 2024.
The DSS also alleged that El-Rufai, while acting in cahoots with others still at large, used technical equipment that compromised public safety, national security and instilled reasonable apprehension of insecurity among Nigerians, following the unlawful interception of the NSA’s calls, committing an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 131 (2) Nigerian Communications Act 2003.
The former governor was initially detained by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) over money laundering allegations, but was subsequently transferred to the custody of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) over corruption allegations.
Meanwhile, the court has fixed April 23 for his arraignment. Justice Abdulmalik of the Federal High Court in Abuja has adjourned the case against former Kaduna State Governor, Nasir El-Rufai, to April 23 for arraignment.
DSS Counsel, Oluwole Aladedoyin, told the court that El-Rufai was still in the ICPC custody over alleged misappropriation of funds, urging it to adjourn the matter until March 10 to enable the anti-graft agency produce his client, as the DSS has no control over the anti-graft agency, despite being a sister agency.
Defence Counsel, Oluwole Iyamu, did not oppose the application, but told the court that based on discussions with the Prosecution, the state would not oppose an application for bail, the offences being bailable.
The defence subsequently applied for the bail application to be taken before further proceedings in the matter, but the prosecution opposed this, urging the court to defer consideration of bail for two weeks.
Iyamu argued that keeping the defendant in custody for two additional weeks would amount to suppression, saying his client had not been brought before the court for arraignment and the defence did not take the defendant into custody and therefore could not produce him in court.
According to him, it would have been a different situation if the DSS had custody of the defendant, suggesting that the circumstances surrounding his detention required judicial intervention.
Relying on Section 159, he urged the court to exercise its powers to order the production of the defendant, regardless of which agency currently had custody of him.
Ruling on the submissions, Justice Abdumalik held that since the defendant had not yet been arraigned, the issue of bail could not arise.
Citing Section 156 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (2015), the Judge described the bail application as premature and subsequently adjourned the matter until April 23, this year, for arraignment.

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